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ETHICS OF LOVE?  
MORALITY AND THE MEANING OF DIVINE LOVE1 
JOHN C. PECKHAM 
Associate Professor of Theology and Christian Philosophy 
jpeckham@andrews.edu 
Abstract 
While there is wide agreement on the importance of love to Christian ethics, just 
what an ethics of love includes and entails differs depending upon how Christian 
love is understood. Toward clarifying the relationship between love and Christian 
ethics, this essay briefly engages the highly influential agapist conception of love 
and questions its sufficiency as the basis of Christian ethics. Consideration of some 
apparent shortcomings of the agapist conception leads to the proposal that the 
continued quest for a more intentionally and distinctively biblical conception of 
divine love is integral to a compelling and faithfully Christian ethics of love. 
 
Keywords: Christian ethics, love, agape, eros, altruism. 
Introduction 
“Love is the only norm.”2 This statement, when unpacked, is the basis of 
Christian ethics according to Joseph Fletcher’s seminal work, Situation Ethics. Even 
if one successfully addresses the numerous questions that arise surrounding the 
supposition that love is the foundation of Christian ethics, an enormous query 
remains. What is love? This is perhaps the most enduring criticism of Fletcher’s 
system of situation ethics.3 One might point out that perhaps the criticism, while 
seemingly valid in itself, is unfair to pin specifically to Fletcher, considering the 
notorious difficulty pertaining to various attempts to define love.4 However, that 
 
1This article is dedicated to the memory of my beloved teacher, colleague, and friend, 
Dr. Miroslav Kiš, to whom I will ever remain grateful. 
2Joseph F. Fletcher, Situation Ethics: The New Morality (Philadelphia, PA: Westminster, 
1966), 69. 
3See David Clyde Jones, Biblical Christian Ethics (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1994); 
Norman Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1971), 75. 
4Divine love is conceived and described in various ways. As Kevin J. Vanhoozer puts 
it, “the problem is not that God loves, but rather what God’s love is.” “Introduction: The 
Love of God—Its Place, Meaning, and Function in Systematic Theology,” in Nothing 
Greater, Nothing Better: Theological Essays on the Love of God, ed. Kevin J. Vanhoozer (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2001), 7. 
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is just the issue; it is difficult, if not impossible, to construct a system of ethics 
upon an idea which is, at best, imprecise. Nevertheless, while Fletcher’s particular 
variety of love ethics differs substantially from other varieties of love ethics, he is 
certainly not alone in positing love as a foundational principle of normative 
ethics.5 
Scripture appears to endorse the centrality of love with regard to Christian 
ethics. For instance, Paul presents the theological virtues of faith, hope, and love, 
“but the greatest of these is love” (1 Cor 13.13).6 Jesus located love at the heart of 
Christianity. When asked to identify the greatest commandment Jesus responded 
by restating two love commandments found in the OT, “‘You shall love the Lord 
your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your mind.’ This 
is the great and foremost commandment. The second is like it, ‘You shall love 
your neighbor as yourself.’ On these two commandments depend the whole Law 
and the Prophets” (Matt 22:37–40; cf. Mark 12:30–31; Deut 6:5; Lev 19:18). 
Nevertheless, while biblical emphasis on love is readily apparent, what an “ethics 
of love” actually entails has historically been much more difficult to ascertain.  
This essay is offered as a sort of prolegomena to a potential ethics of love, 
based on the premise that Christian ethics ought to be rooted in a distinctively 
Christian theology, which itself must be firmly grounded in Scripture. For this 
reason, I will briefly discuss issues relative to the theological conception of divine 
love, followed by a review of some relevant biblical-linguistic questions which 
point to my thesis that a more intentionally and distinctively biblical conception of 
divine love is integral to a Christian ethics of love. 
The Agape-Eros Distinction in Theology 
In the history of Christianity, there is no shortage of definitions of love. Yet, 
despite a richly varying history of finely nuanced theological conceptions, the 
broad contours of divine love have remained strikingly constant in the classical 
 
5A number of ethicists and theologians have employed the concept of love as central 
to Christian ethics. Among many others, consider Reinhold Niebuhr, Love and Justice: 
Selections from the Shorter Writings of Reinhold Niebuhr, Library of Theological Ethics 
(Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1992); Gene H. Outka, Agape: An Ethical 
Analysis, Yale Publications in Religion (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1972); 
Stephen G. Post, A Theory of Agape: On the Meaning of Christian Love (Lewisburg, PA: 
Bucknell University Press, 1990); Paul Tillich, Love, Power, and Justice; Ontological Analyses and 
Ethical Applications (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954); Edward Collins Vacek, 
Love, Human and Divine: The Heart of Christian Ethics, Moral Traditions & Moral Arguments 
(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1994). 
6All biblical references are from the NASB unless otherwise noted. 
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theist tradition ranging from Augustine to Thomas Aquinas to Martin Luther.7 
These three towering thinkers in the history of Christian theology agree that 
God’s love is absolutely gratuitous, pure, and unilateral beneficence, with the 
object(s) of divine love providing no actual or possible enjoyment or value to God 
in Godself. 
Augustine’s view is rooted in a divine ontology which conceives of God as 
perfect, absolutely simple, timeless, immutable, self-sufficient, and impassible.8 
Hence, it is not surprising that Augustine seems to struggle to describe the nature 
of divine love. For instance, he writes, “In what way then does He [God] love us? 
As objects of use or as objects of enjoyment? If He enjoys us, He must be in need 
of good from us, and no sane man will say that; for all the good we enjoy is either 
Himself, or what comes from Himself. … He does not enjoy us then, but makes 
use of us. For if He neither enjoys nor uses us, I am at a loss to discover in what 
way He can love us.”9 Notably, even with regard to Augustine’s so-called use love 
(uti), God does not love any external goodness, but he loves only his own 
 
7Since the scope of this work does not permit a survey of the vast historical theology 
of love, I have selected three of the most influential theologians in Christian history, from 
the early church (Augustine), from the medieval church (Aquinas), and from the 
Reformation (Martin Luther). These three suffice to show the continuity of the broad 
contours regarding the Christian conception of divine love. See, in this regard, John C. 
Peckham, The Concept of Divine Love (New York: Peter Lang, 2014), 31–92. For more on the 
historical theology of love consider Vincent Brümmer, The Model of Love: A Study in 
Philosophical Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); John Burnaby, Amor 
Dei, a Study of the Religion of St. Augustine. The Hulsean Lectures for 1938 (London: Hodder & 
Stoughton, 1960); Liz Carmichael, Friendship: Interpreting Christian Love (New York: Clark, 
2004); Martin Cyril D’Arcy, The Mind and Heart of Love (London: Faber & Faber, 1954); 
Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros, trans., Philip S. Watson (London: S.P.C.K., 1953); John 
M. Rist, Eros and Psyche: Studies in Plato, Plotinus, and Origen (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1964); Denis de Rougemont, Love in the Western World (Garden City, NY: 
Doubleday, 1957); Irving Singer, The Nature of Love, vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1987). 
8It is widely recognized that Augustine was affected by Plato’s ontology through the 
influence of neo-Platonism. The concepts of absolute simplicity, aseity, and others are 
congruent with Plato’s theory of the proton philon (highest love). Accordingly, Augustine 
comments, “the perfection of His [God’s] being is consummate because He is immutable, 
and therefore neither gains nor loses.” Augustine, Ep. 118.3.15 (NPNF 1:877). Further, 
God has an “ineffably simple nature.” Augustine, Trin. 15.19.37 (NPNF 3:424). He is the 
“unchangeably eternal” one. Augustine, Conf. 11.31.41 (NPNF 1:319). Moreover, he is the 
“eternal, spiritual, and unchangeable good.” Augustine, Civ. 15.22 (NPNF 2:648). 
9Augustine, Doctr. chr. 1.31.34 (NPNF, 2:1109). For Augustine, “to enjoy a thing is to 
rest with satisfaction in it for its own sake. To use, on the other hand, is to employ 
whatever means are at one’s disposal to obtain what one desires.” Augustine, Doctr. chr. 
1.4.4 (NPNF, 2:1090). 
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goodness.10 In this way, divine love is not affected by its object and, accordingly, 
human love is in no way advantageous to God. Thus, Augustine, while positing 
that God does love humans, restricts divine love to pure beneficence. 
Thomas Aquinas adopts a similar perfect being ontology, including the notion 
that God is utterly impassible, and thus divine love cannot be affected.11 God 
loves, but his is a passionless love, it is an “act of the will.”12 Divine love (caritas) 
may thus be equated with benevolence. Such love is never caused by its object but 
always by God alone. As such, divine love is therefore nothing more or less than a 
purposive, rational act of God’s will.13 God can neither enjoy, nor appreciate any 
beings; love provides no value for God who remains altogether unaffected. 
Martin Luther, although providing nuance regarding the notion of impassibility 
in his theology of the cross (theologia crucis),14 nevertheless ultimately maintains that 
God has no passions in saying, “God is not capable of suffering.”15 He is perhaps 
 
10In God’s “use” of humans there is “no reference to His own advantage, but to ours 
only; and, so far as He is concerned, has reference only to His goodness.” Augustine, 
Doctr. chr. 1.32 (NPNF, 2:1109, 1110). “But neither does He use after our fashion of using. 
For when we use objects, we do so with a view to the full enjoyment of the goodness of 
God. God, however, in His use of us, has reference to His own goodness.” Augustine, 
Doctr. chr. 1.32.35 (NPNF 2:1109). 
11Aquinas is clear that “in God there are no passions. Now love is a passion. Therefore 
love is not in God.” Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiæ 1.20.1.1. Further, “sorrow … over 
the misery of others belongs not to God.” Aquinas, Summa Theologiæ 1.21.3. God’s virtues 
that relate to giving and liberality are purely products of the divine will. Aquinas, Summa 
Theologiæ 1.21.1. 
12“Therefore acts of the sensitive appetite, inasmuch as they have annexed to them 
some bodily change, are called passions; whereas acts of the will are not so called. Love, 
therefore, and joy and delight are passions; in so far as they denote acts of the intellective 
appetite, they are not passions. It is in this latter sense that they are in God. Hence the 
Philosopher says (Ethic. vii): ‘God rejoices by an operation that is one and simple,’ and for 
the same reason He loves without passion.” Aquinas, Summa Theologiæ 1.20.1. 
13For Aquinas, “the will also should be the efficient cause of that act” of love. Aquinas, 
Summa Theologiæ 2-2.23.2. 
14For instance Dennis Ngien theorizes that Luther’s theology actually requires divine 
passibility. Dennis Ngien, The Suffering of God According to Martin Luther's Theologia Crucis, 
American University Studies, Series VII, Theology and Religion 181 (New York: Peter 
Lang, 1995). This is based on Luther’s communicatio idiomatum, ascribing to Christ’s divinity 
what happens to humanity and vice versa. Martin Luther, Luther’s Works, ed. Jan Pelikan, 
Hilton C. Oswald, and Helmut T. Lehmann, 55 vols. (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1999), 37:210 
[hereafter LW]. However, it seems that for Luther, divine passibility is actually limited to 
God in Christ, but does not reach God in Godself. Cf. Alister E. McGrath, Luther’s 
Theology of the Cross: Martin Luther’s Theological Breakthrough (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985). See 
the further discussion in Peckham, The Concept of Divine Love, 77–86. 
15LW 38:254. He adds, “the Deity surely cannot suffer and die.” LW 37:210.  
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even more adamant that divine love does not enjoy good but merely confers 
good. Even if human nature was capable of loving God, God would remain 
unaffected by such love in accordance with his self-sufficiency and impassibility.16 
Furthermore, the gratuitous love of God (characterized thematically as agape) is to 
be sharply differentiated from all human types of love. As Luther puts it: “Rather 
than seeking its own good, God’s love flows forth and bestows good.”17 In this 
way, “sinners are attractive because they are loved; they are not loved because they 
are attractive.”18 God receives nothing from humans but rather liberally gives out 
of his extravagant goodness.19 
Despite the striking agreement amongst the conceptions of divine love of 
Augustine, Aquinas, and Luther, sharp disagreements appear regarding the matter 
of human love. Augustine believed that humans could love God as the only true 
object of love. The relative quality of love as desire is dependent upon its object; 
desirous love for a good object is proper human love. Although this love is itself a 
gift of God, humans ought to desire God as the ultimate object of goodness and 
in this way truly love Him. “The right will is, therefore, well-directed love [amor], 
and the wrong will is ill-directed love [amor]. Love [amor], then, yearning to have 
what is loved, is desire [cupiditas]; and having and enjoying [frui] it, is joy; fleeing 
what is opposed to it, it is fear; and feeling what is opposed to it, when it has 
befallen it, it is sadness. Now these motions are evil if the love [amor] is evil; good 
if the love [amor] is good.”20 The view of Aquinas has a great deal in common with 
Augustine, positing the possibility of true human love for God and for others, 
 
16It should be noted that Luther at times speaks of divine love by employing 
passionate language. For instance, he speaks of God’s love as the “blood of love.” LW, 
30:300, 301. He also speaks of the zeal of the Lord against the enemies of God’s people. 
LW, 16:102. In these cases, nevertheless, divine love is a willed love that remains 
unaffected by external influence.  
17LW 31:57. Cf. Daniel Day Williams, The Spirit and the Forms of Love (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1968), 78. 
18LW 31:57. Luther writes, “God’s love does not find, but creates, its lovable object; 
man’s love is caused by its lovable object … sinners are lovely because they are loved: they 
are not loved because they are lovely. [L]ove of the cross means … that which betakes 
itself not to where it can find something good to enjoy, but where it may confer good to 
the wicked and the needy.” Martin Luther, D. Martin Luthers Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe, 
56 vols. (Weimar, Germany: Böhlau, 1883–1938), 1:36 [hereafter WA], quoted in Nygren, 
Agape and Eros, 725, 726. 
19Thus, divine love is an overflowing spring. WA 36:360, 8, quoted in Nygren, Agape 
and Eros, 730. Cf. Singer, The Nature of Love, 1:328. Luther compares this to a furnace 
saying, “If anyone would paint and aptly portray God, then he must draw a picture of pure 
love, as if the Divine nature were nothing but a furnace and fire of such love, which fills 
heaven and earth.” WA 3:424, 16, quoted in Nygren, Agape and Eros, 724. 
20Augustine, Civ. 14.7 (NPNF 2:574). 
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including the possibility of friendship with God. For Aquinas, love is always 
directed towards some good (amor concupiscentiae) which is willed toward someone 
(amor amicitiae) whether oneself or another.21 Luther, however, adamantly disagrees 
with both Augustine and Aquinas, positing that it is utterly impossible for humans 
to love God. According to Luther, because of intrinsic sinfulness, humans are 
ontologically incapable of love. Thus humans may only “Love God by admitting 
your utter and total inability to love God.”22 Luther states, “No one is able to love 
God from his whole heart, etc., and his neighbor as himself.”23 For Luther, then, 
all true love flows downwards, there is no such thing as love that flows upwards 
toward God. 
The general agreement about divine love and yet considerable disagreement 
relative to human love among these thinkers is not surprising considering the 
similarity of their doctrines of God on the one hand and the dissimilarity of the 
respective soteriologies on the other hand.24 For all three theologians, God is 
(among other things) utterly impassible. If God is, in fact, utterly impassible, 
divine love could be nothing more or less than what these great thinkers have 
defined, in a word: beneficence. No mutuality, no reciprocality, no bilateral divine-
human love relationship is possible. Divine love must be merely God’s goodness 
infused or otherwise bestowed upon human objects who could make no 
difference to the life of God in Godself. As such, divine love amounts to what has 
been termed in many Christian circles as (thematic) agape: pure giving that never 
receives. 
Perhaps the foremost recent contributor to this notion of agape as distinctly 
Christian love is Anders Nygren. Through Nygren’s work the categories of agape 
and eros in thinking about divine love have become incredibly influential such that 
nearly every serious work on the topic of love deals with these categories.25 
Nygren defines divine love as agape by contrasting it with eros.26 For Nygren, the 
 
21Aquinas, Summa Theologiæ 2-1.26.4. 
22Singer, The Nature of Love, 1:327. 
23LW 34:309. 
24The contrast is sharpest between Luther and Aquinas due to Luther’s axiomatic view 
of sola gratia. However, Luther also disagrees with Augustine’s allowance for an upward 
love (desire) toward God. 
25See Nygren, Agape and Eros. Gene Outka goes so far as to state, “Nygren so 
effectively posed issues about love that they have had a prominence in theology and ethics 
they never had before. … Thus, whatever the reader may think of it, one may justifiably 
regard his work as the beginning of the modern treatment of the subject.” Outka, Agape, 1. 
For a contemporary advocate of Nygren’s view of agape see Colin Grant, “For the Love of 
God: Agape,” Journal of Religious Ethics 24, no. 1 (1996): 3–21. 
26He contends that eros and agape “represent two streams that run through the whole 
history of religion, alternately clashing against one another and mingling with one another. 
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only true Christian love (agape) is: (1) spontaneous and unmotivated; (2) indifferent 
to value; (3) creative; and (4) the initiator of fellowship. Nygren’s perspective is 
further laid out in a series of antitheses, he contends that “Eros is acquisitive desire 
and longing” while “Agape is sacrificial giving.” “Eros is an upward movement, 
man’s way to God” while “Agape is sacrificial giving’ which “comes down … 
God’s way to man.” “Eros is man’s effort” while “Agape is God’s grace.” “Eros is 
determined by the quality, the beauty and worth, of its object, it is not 
spontaneous but ‘evoked’, ‘motivated’” while “Agape is sovereign in relation to its 
object, and is directed to both ‘the evil and the good’; it is spontaneous, 
‘overflowing’, ‘unmotivated.’”27  
In continuity with the classic conception of divine love, Nygren believes that 
God lacks nothing and, hence, desires nothing (perfection and self-sufficiency). As 
such, the aspects of love represented by the eros motif are utterly inappropriate to 
a Christian conception of divine love. Rather, divine love in Christianity (thematic 
agape) is not emotive, evaluative, or motivated but a purposive, willed, indifferent 
love totally distinct from any need or desire. Biblical expressions of divine 
emotion “are on this view merely crude anthropomorphisms.”28  All other types 
of love (e.g. eros, philia) are not Christian love.29 Eros is ruled out for the 
aforementioned reasons while friendship love (philia) is considered inappropriate 
due to the vast inequality between God and humans. Nygren frames his study as a 
motif analysis, rather than a linguistic study, but nevertheless claims that agape was 
a theme specifically chosen by the NT writers to convey this sola gratia type of love 
which is “indifferent to human merit” and also to exclude all other concepts of 
love.30 In support of this view, he contends that the NT conception of love is 
different from the OT conception of love.31 As such, for Nygren, the love 
between God and the world is a one-way connection that is wholly predicated on 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
They stand for what may be described as the egocentric and the theocentric attitude in 
religion.” Nygren, Agape and Eros, 205.  
27Nygren, Agape and Eros, 210. In this way, eros stems from self-love whereas agape is 
divine love toward others. 
28Gary D. Badcock, “The Concept of Love: Divine and Human,” in Nothing Greater, 
Nothing Better: Theological Essays on the Love of God, ed. Kevin J. Vanhoozer (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Eerdmans, 2001), 40. 
29Nygren, Agape and Eros, 92. 
30Nygren, Agape and Eros, 57. In fact, he goes so far as to consider it a “new creation of 
Christianity.” Nygren, Agape and Eros, 48. However, Carmichael points out, “More 
objective scholarship suggests that the appearance of agape is to be attributed, not to 
theological motivation but to the natural evolution of the Greek language.” Carmichael, 
Friendship, 36. 
31Nygren, Agape and Ero, 62. This is in keeping with his view of discontinuity between 
Judaism and Christianity. 
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the sovereign will of God. God gains no value from this relationship. Divine love 
is utterly gratuitous.32  
Consequently, the only true agent of love is God; humans in themselves are 
incapable of agape love. Thus, a human loves God only “because God’s 
unmotivated love has overwhelmed him and taken control of him, so that he 
cannot do other than love God.”33 Human to human agape love may take place, 
but it is not actually originated by humans. Rather, it is divine love that flows 
through humans.34 As Nygren puts it, “What we have here is a purely theocentric 
love, in which all choice on man's part is excluded.”35Agape love is thus 
unconditional love predicated on the divine will alone, which itself is in 
accordance with the superabundance of the divine nature of agape; divine love, 
then, could never be earned or merited.36 True agape love is nothing else than that 
unilateral beneficence that flows from God to others. 
Although Nygren’s view has come under a great deal of criticism, it remains an 
influential study, and many of his conclusions remain in significant streams of 
biblical and systematic theology. For instance, Nygren’s basic premise regarding 
the categories of need love (corresponding to eros) and gift love (corresponding to 
thematic agape) continues to be influential (and at times, axiomatic) in some 
circles.37 On the other hand, numerous questions have been raised regarding his 
reconstruction of historical theology as well as the adequacy of a conception of 
divine love that rules out genuinely mutual divine-human relationships.38 Indeed, 
 
32“God does not love in order to obtain any advantage thereby, but quite simply 
because it is his nature to love with a love that seeks, not to get, but to give.” Nygren, 
Agape and Eros, 201. 
33Nygren, Agape and Eros, 214. For Nygren, “[t]herein lies the profound significance of 
the idea of predestination: man has not selected God, but God has elected man.” Nygren, 
Agape and Eros, 214. 
34Thus, “To the extent that man participates in the divine, and only to that extent, is it 
right for me to love him.” Nygren, Agape and Eros, 215.  
35Nygren, Agape and Eros, 213. 
36“The man who is loved by God has no value in himself; what gives him value is 
precisely the fact that God loves him. Agape is a value-creating principle.” Nygren, Agape 
and Eros, 78. 
37For instance, these categories were adopted and popularized by C. S. Lewis in The 
Four Loves (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1988). 
38For some direct criticisms of Nygren’s view, see Brümmer, The Model of Love, 137; 
Burnaby, Amor Dei; Thomas Jay Oord, “Matching Theology and Piety: An Evangelical 
Process Theology of Love” (Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate University, 1999), 
113; Williams, The Spirit and the Forms of Love, 38. In this regard, according to Martin 
d’Arcy, “Eros and Agape are not enemies but friends.” D’Arcy, The Mind and Heart of Love, 
304. Cf. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, 3 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1951), 1:281. 
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in the field of theology, Nygren’s so-called agapist conception of divine love has 
endured heavy criticism from many recent theologians who believe that the 
exclusion of reciprocal love rules out meaningful divine-human relationships.39 
From the standpoint of biblical scholarship, many have pointed out the failure of 
Nygren’s agape motif to cohere with the biblical data, even when investigation is 
restricted to the NT.40 Indeed, perhaps the strongest criticism of Nygren, despite 
his claim to not be making a semantic argument, is the apparent biblical testimony 
which contradicts Nygren’s proposed motifs, to which we now turn.41?
 
39For instance, consider Brümmer, The Model of Love; Burnaby, Amor Dei; Carmichael, 
Friendship; D’Arcy, The Mind and Heart of Love; Charles Hartshorne, The Divine Relativity, 2nd 
printing ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1964); Charles Hartshorne, 
Omnipotence and Other Theological Mistakes (Albany, NY: State University of New York, 
1984); Eberhard Jüngel, The Doctrine of the Trinity: God's Being Is in Becoming, trans. Horton 
Harris (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1976); Eberhard Jüngel, God as the Mystery of the 
World: On the Foundation of the Theology of the Crucified One in the Dispute between Theism and 
Atheism (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1983); Sallie McFague, Models of God: Theology for an 
Ecological, Nuclear Age (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress, 1987); Jürgen Moltmann, The Trinity and 
the Kingdom: The Doctrine of God, trans. Margaret Kohl (San Francisco, CA: Harper & Row, 
1981); Thomas C. Oden, The Living God (San Francisco, CA: Harper & Row, 1987); 
Schubert Miles Ogden, The Reality of God and Other Essays (New York: Harper & Row, 
1966); Oord, “Matching Theology and Piety: An Evangelical Process Theology of Love”; 
Catherine Osborne, Eros Unveiled: Plato and the God of Love (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1994); 
Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley, 3 vols., vol. 1 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1991); Clark H. Pinnock, “Constrained by Love: Divine 
Self-Restraint According to Open Theism,” Perspectives in Religious Studies 34, no. 2 (2007): 
149–160; Post, A Theory of Agape; Richard Rice, “Process Theism and the Open View of 
God: The Crucial Difference,” in Searching for an Adequate God: A Dialogue between Process and 
Free Will Theists, ed. David Ray Griffin, John B. Cobb, and Clark H. Pinnock (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2000), 184; Mark Lloyd Taylor, God Is Love: A Study in the Theology of 
Karl Rahner (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1986); Williams, The Spirit and the Forms of Love. 
40For instance, Reinhold Niebuhr explicitly criticizes Nygren for making the distinction 
between agape and human love too sharp. The Nature and Destiny of Man: A Christian 
Interpretation, 2 vols. (New York: Scribner, 1964), 2:84. Many others have pointed out that 
the distinction between agape and other words for love, specifically the philia family, is not 
supported by the linguistic data. For instance, Badcock contends, “The Bible itself does 
not actually make the rigid distinction that Nygren presupposes between Christian love, 
agape, and other forms of human love.” “The Concept of Love,” 37. Cf. John A. T. 
Robinson, “Agape and Eros,” Theology 48, no. 299 (1945): 99; Post, A Theory of Agape, 88, 
89. 
41In this regard, William Klassen comments, “Nygren’s thesis has been all but 
discredited.” “Love in the NT and Early Jewish Literature,” ABD 4:385. See, further, Roy 
F. Butler, The Meaning of Agapao and Phileo in the Greek New Testament (Lawrence, KS: 
Coronado Press, 1977), 70; Geraint Vaughan Jones, “Agape and Eros: Some Notes on 
Dostoievsky,” Expository Times 66, no. 1 (1954–1955): 3; Oord, “Matching Theology and 
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Agape in the NT 
Confusion over the precise meaning of divine love is not peculiar to the realm of 
systematic theology, but also appears relative to the understanding of agape within 
biblical scholarship. Numerous studies of love posit, to a greater or lesser degree, 
a unique type of NT love which is exemplified by the term (or theme) agape. In 
this way, remnants of Nygren’s view seem to linger in some theological circles. In 
positing a unique and prime position for agape as the exclusive and inimitable 
Christian love, some have asserted that the agape root is almost totally absent in 
pre-biblical Greek.42 With that, some scholars have believed that the agape word 
group was used by NT writers to signify a new and unique concept of love. 
Others have claimed the use of the agape word group was used merely to 
distinguish from Greek concepts of love such as eros (which does not appear in 
the NT) and “not because the word had a particularly positive connotation.”43  
However, the verb agapa? appears often in post-Homeric literature and the noun 
agape seems to come from translating the Hebrew word for love, aheb.44 
Accordingly, some believe the agape word group was already becoming prominent 
at the time of the biblical usage and its presence in the NT is not necessarily the 
result of a choice to convey some new or distinct meaning. Robert Joly makes the 
compelling argument, widely adopted by contemporary scholars, that the increase 
in usage of the agape word group in the NT may be accounted for exclusively on 
the basis of diachronic linguistic shifts rather than theological purpose(s).45 As D. 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Piety,” 123; James Moffat, Love in the New Testament (New York: Harper, 1930); John M. 
Rist, “Some Interpretations of Agape and Eros,” in The Philosophy and Theology of Anders 
Nygren (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1970), 172. 
42See Ethelbert Stauffer, “??????, ?????, ???????s,” in TDNT, eds. Gerhard Kittel, 
Geoffrey William Bromiley, and Gerhard Friedrich (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1964), 
1:37. There is a striking increase in the use of the agapa? word group in biblical Greek 
relative to extra-biblical literature around the time of the LXX. Further, while agapa? 
appears relatively frequently in Greek from Homer onward, the noun agape is not very well 
represented in extra-biblical Greek literature, if at all. Whether the noun agape is attested at 
all in pre-LXX Greek has been a matter of some dispute, though an older noun, agapesin, is 
present in classical Greek literature. 
43Leon Morris, Testaments of Love: A Study of Love in the Bible (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 1981), 103. 
44See W. Günther and H. G. Link, “Love,” in New International Dictionary of New 
Testament Theology, ed. Colin Brown (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1986), 2:539. 
45Joly contends the preference for the agape word group was present in Hellenistic 
times and that the change took place for linguistic reasons from the fourth century BC 
onward; specifically, philein was moving from “love” to “kiss” (due to the disappearance of 
the older word for kiss) while agapan moved from conveying “be content with” to 
conveying “love” with some overlap with previous meanings. See Le vocabulaire chrétien de 
l'amour est-il original: Philein et agapan dans le grec antique (Brussels: Press universitaires de 
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A. Carson explains, “there are excellent diachronic reasons in Greek philology to 
explain the rise of the [agape] word group, so one should not rush too quickly 
toward theological explanations.”46 
Leon Morris nevertheless maintains the unique significance of agape as utilized 
by the NT writers. While he acknowledges that “the linguistics” do not prove the 
distinctive nature of the agape word group, he nevertheless believes that the 
biblical writers chose this word “because they had a new idea about the essential 
meaning of love.”47 He dismisses the term philia as deficient to convey “the 
essential New Testament idea of love.”48 For the Christian conception of love, 
only the term agape will suffice.49 
However, as Morris himself recognizes, the lexical evidence does not seem to 
support such an exclusive meaning. On the contrary, the evidence casts doubt on 
the idea that agape is a word that connotes merely (or even primarily) the unilateral 
gift love of God, distinct from other words for love. In the LXX, for instance, the 
agape word group has a broad semantic range, including referring to rapacious lust 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Bruxelles, 1968), 33. So Carson, Exegetical Fallacies (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 
1996), 51, 52; Moisés Silva, Biblical Words and Their Meaning: An Introduction to Lexical 
Semantics (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1995), 96. C. C. Tarelli suggested something 
similar prior to Joly. See “Agape,” Journal of Theological Studies 1 (1950): 64–67. Cf. James 
Barr, “Words for Love in Biblical Greek,” in The Glory of Christ in the New Testament, ed. L. 
D. Hurst and N. T. Wright (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1987), 6, 11. Benjamin B. Warfield 
also saw agape as the word that was current at the time of writing, not as a deliberate 
choice by the authors. “Terminology of Love in the New Testament,” Princeton Theological 
Review 16 (1918): 184. 
46D. A. Carson, The Difficult Doctrine of the Love of God (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 
2000), 27. 
47Morris, Testaments of Love, 125. Morris adopts Nygren’s “basic idea of agape [a]s that of 
self-giving love for the unworthy” while allowing that Nygren may have been too sharp in 
his distinctions between agape and eros and “equated it [agape] too narrowly with the use of 
particular Greek words.” Nevertheless, Morris contends, “there is such a love as he 
[Nygren] describes as Agape and that it is the Christian understanding of love seems clear. 
God’s love for us is evoked by God’s own inner nature, not by anything worthy in us” and 
divine love “evokes a corresponding love within people.” Leon Morris, John (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1995), 293. 
48Morris, Testaments of Love, 119. Cf. Ceslas Spicq, “?????,” in Theological Lexicon of the 
New Testament (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1994), 11. 
49Similarly, Stauffer sees agape as possibly conveying a colorless sense to mean 
something like prefer, denoting “a free and decisive act determined by its subject,” 
whereas eros “seeks in others the fulfillment of its own life’s hunger.” Stauffer, TDNT 1:37. 
Cranfield states that “Although used for euphony as a synonym for phile? and era?, agapa? 
lacked the warmth of the former and the intensity of the latter.” Charles E. B. Cranfield, 
“Love,” in A Theological Word Book of the Bible, ed. Alan Richardson (London, UK: SCMP, 
1950), 134. 
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as is seen in the use of the agape word group in the narrative of Amnon’s rape of 
his sister, Tamar (2 Sam 13:15; see also other examples of misdirected or deficient 
“love” in Pss 11:5; 52:3; Amos 5:15; Hos 9:1). Further, phile? and agapa? seem to 
be used interchangeably on numerous occasions in the LXX (Gen 37:3–4; Lam 
1:2) and show close connection in the NT, overlapping with regard to every major 
aspect of love such that they are often used interchangeably. Both terms are used 
to describe the Father’s love for the Son (John 5:20; cf. John 3:35), the Father’s 
love for the disciples because of their love for Jesus (John 16:27; cf. 14:21, 23), 
Jesus’s love for humans (Rev 3:19; cf. 3:9), Jesus’s love for individuals (John 11:36; 
cf. 11:5), human love for other humans (John 15:19; cf. 13:34), human love for 
their own life (John 12:25; cf. Rev 12:11) and both terms describe the disciple 
whom Jesus loves (John 20:2; cf. 21:7).50  
Such usage, especially with divine agency, demonstrates that phile? is not an 
inferior type of love but in fact may describe the very love of God, falsifying the 
assertions of some that agapa? is the only term sufficient to depict divine love and 
that phile? is a lesser, merely human, kind of love. Rather, both word groups may 
refer to the highest and noblest aspects of love or to inferior qualities such as 
misdirected love.51 As D. A. Carson states, “there is nothing intrinsic to the verb 
 
50Notably, the only subject-object relations of love that are not described by phile? are 
human love for the Father and Christ’s love for the Father. However, the compound 
philotheos does describe “lovers of God” (2 Tim 3:4) and Jesus’s love for the Father is only 
explicitly stated once. The absence of instances of phile? descriptive of Christ’s love for the 
Father, then, is probably accidental given that explicit mention of Christ’s love for the 
Father appears only once. Further, both the agapa? and phile? word groups are used of 
preferential love (Matt 10:37; John 11:5; 13:1), misdirected love (Matt 23:6; Luke 20:46; 
22:15; Rev 22:15; 2 Tim 4:10; cf. Prov 21:17), conditional divine love (John 14:21, 23; 
16:27), emotion and/or passion (John 11:36; 13:1; compare James 4:4), pleasure, 
enjoyment and/or evaluative love (Matt 3:17; 6:5; 17:5; 23:6; compare Gen 27:4, 9, 14), 
familial (Matt 10:37; Col 3:19; cf. Gen 37:3–4) and other insider love (John 13:1; 15:14–
15), and love that includes discipline (Rev 3:19; Heb 12:6). See the extensive discussion of 
the various NT terms for love in Peckham, The Concept of Divine Love, 352–372. 
51Many scholars consider the terms synonymous (or nearly synonymous) in most cases, 
while recognizing minor differences in the overall semantic range. See Carson, Exegetical 
Fallacies, 51–52; Gustav Stählin, “?????, ?????????, ??????,” TDNT 9:115, 116, 124; 
Raymond E. Brown, The Gospel According to John I-XII (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 
1966), 498; William Hendriksen, The Gospel According to John (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 
1953), 2:487, 494–500; Köstenberger, John, 596; Günther and Link, “??????,” NIDNTT 
2:543. For example, relative to personal love, the verb phile? is always used in the NT 
within an associative relationship of some commonality, i.e., “insider love,” whereas agapa? 
may signify both “insider” and “outsider” love (more often the former). However, the 
phile? word group includes love for the other (including the stranger) in the compound 
terms philoxenos and philoxenia (1 Tim 3:2; Rom 12:13; Heb 13:2; cf. Matt 11:19; Luke 7:34). 
Notably, in this regard, the oft-mentioned variation of terminology in John 21:15–17 is 
underdeterminative. Many scholars view the variation between agapa? and phile? in John 21 
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?? ???? (agapa?) or the noun ?? ??? (agape) to prove its real meaning or hidden 
meaning refers to some special kind of love.”52 As numerous scholars have 
recognized, then, the usage of the agape word group in Scripture does not support 
the view that agape exclusively connotes a unique type of divine or Christian love.53  
Nevertheless, notwithstanding the considerable evidence that stands against 
the view that Scripture reserves agape for some special kind of exclusively divine 
gift love, Nygren’s agapist conception of divine love remains in popular and 
scholarly works alike, including numerous theological dictionaries, encyclopedias, 
and biblical commentaries. As such, considerable confusion exists in both 
theological and biblical scholarship over the precise meaning of love generally and 
divine love specifically. 
Agape and Ethics 
The issues surveyed above are striking not only with regard to the potential 
implications for theology and biblical scholarship, but with respect to the viability 
of an intelligible, Christian, ethics of love. Despite the aforementioned theological 
and linguistic difficulties, the agapist view has wielded significant influence on the 
development of some lines of Christian ethics. However, others question whether 
the agapist conception of divine love as emotionally aloof, disinterested, 
mechanical, perfunctory and unilateral, can adequately speak to the ethical issues 
that Christians face, especially with regard to human relationships and suffering. 
Perhaps proponents of the agapist conception of divine love would argue that 
only such pure love merits the name Christian love (agape) and the fact that such 
love seems so foreign to human nature says nothing about its validity as such. 
Accordingly, humans would ideally be utterly self-abnegating, without desire, 
wholly beneficent individuals, lacking any self-love or regard for self.54 However, 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
as merely stylistic while those who believe the variation signifies difference of meaning are 
divided on what difference of meaning is purported to be entailed thereby. In this regard, 
see the discussion in John C. Peckham, The Love of God: A Canonical Model (Downers 
Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2015), 75, 76. Cf. the discussion in Peckham, The Concept of 
Divine Love, 366, 367. 
52Carson, Exegetical Fallacies, 32. Carson does see a special meaning for divine love, but 
finds no basis for such a view in the semantics but in the “sentences, paragraphs, 
discourses, and so forth.” Ibid., 53. 
53In addition to Carson, consider the works of Roy F. Butler, The Meaning of Agapao and 
Phileo in the Greek New Testament (Lawrence, KS: Coronado, 1977), 70–72; Victor Paul 
Furnish, The Love Command in the New Testament (Nashville, TN: Abingdon, 1972), 20, 21. 
54Some Christian ethicists, however, have long recognized valid forms of self-love 
while cautioning against selfish love, especially the type of self-interest advocated in ethical 
egoism. For example, Vacek makes a case for a positive role of self-love (Edward Collins 
Vacek, Love, Human and Divine: The Heart of Christian Ethics [Washington, DC: Georgetown 
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this raises the question; if the true character of love is altogether selfless and 
disinterested then in what way can humans actually love?55 Unless one maintains 
an extremely optimistic view of human nature, it would appear that if human love 
is possible, it is something quite different from purely selfless altruism. On the 
other hand, Luther’s view remains available: there is no such thing as human love 
(agape) except that which is purely the action of God bestowed on and through a 
passive human agent. 
Notably, a number of biblical texts appear to suggest the possibility of genuine 
human love (agape). For instance, Jesus exhorted his disciples, “A new 
commandment I give to you, that you love [agapa?] one another, even as I have 
loved [agapa?] you, that you also love [agapa?] one another” (John 13:34). What are 
Christians to make of such ethical commands? Beyond the fact that this text 
seems to assume that humans can actually love one another,56 this text also seems 
to posit some similitude between that love which Jesus had for his followers and 
the kind of love that he expects Christians to have for one another. Thus, divine 
love (modeled in the incarnate one himself) is presented as the ground for truly 
Christian love.57 
Furthermore, as we have seen, elsewhere Jesus also proclaims: “You shall love 
[agapa?] your neighbor as yourself” (Matt 22:39; Mark 12:31; cf. Lev 19:18, 34). 
This, coupled with the so-called golden rule (Luke 6:31; Cf. Matt 7:12) would 
seem to contradict an ethics of utter self-abnegation.58 Rather, an ethics based on 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
University Press, 1994], 239–244) and also discusses the tradition that has favored self-
love (Vacek, Love, Human and Divine, 199, 200). Cf. the discussions in Outka, Agape, 275; 
Post, A Theory of Agape, 17, 18. 
55Further, it seems to me that a more biblical conception of love would defeat 
Nietzsche’s critique of “agape” as “resentment” and “suppression” by (among other things) 
showing his criticism of so-called Christian love to be a straw man that is not 
representative of Christian love as it is understood and depicted in Scripture. See, in this 
regard, Friedrich Nietzsche, The Antichrist in The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche, ed. 
Oscar Levy, trans. Anthony M. Ludovici (New York: Macmillan, 1911), 16:128–135. 
56This need not mean that humans have the capacity within themselves as apart from 
God, but may assume the necessity of the work of the Holy Spirit in the life of the 
Christian.  
57Perhaps one might suggest the possibility that the love of Jesus for his followers was 
merely a product of his humanity. However, this cannot be the meaning if one considers 
the comparison in John 15:9, “Just as the Father has loved Me, I have also loved you; 
abide in My love.” 
58Whereas self-sacrifice is virtuous in the appropriate circumstances, “as a universal 
principle, self-sacrifice is self-contradictory.” Vacek, Love, Human and Divine, 184. Imagine 
a world where every individual always acts self-sacrificially. When two people arrive at the 
same door they would both insist on holding the door open for the other and, 
consequently, neither would ever enter. So Vacek, Love, Human and Divine, 184. That is, if 
everyone always gives but never receives, then there would be no one to receive what is 
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appropriate and unselfish self-love is suggested, which implies that at least some 
form of self-love is appropriate for the Christian, since it is presented as a basis of 
neighbor love itself. This likely refers to a proper, unselfish, regard for self which 
is manifested in love for others, perhaps as is modeled in the parable of the Good 
Samaritan.59  
Elsewhere, even some aspects of divine love appear to incorporate some 
motivation that is contingent upon its object.60 For instance, consider the words 
of Jesus recorded in John 14:21, 23, “He who has My commandments and keeps 
them is the one who loves [agapa?] Me; and he who loves [agapa?] Me will be loved 
[agapa?] by My Father, and I will love [agapa?] him and will disclose Myself to him. 
… If anyone loves [agapa?] Me, he will keep My word; and My Father will love 
[agapa?] him, and We will come to him and make Our abode with him” (cf. John 
10:17; 16:27).61 This indicates that humans may not only love one another, but 
may actually love God and that such love for God can also, at least partially, affect 
God’s love for human beings.  
The words of Jesus in these verses seem to conflict with the agapist view that 
divine nature and love requires disinterest. Moreover, the presentation of love in 
these verses appears to depict some significant role for the object(s) of divine 
love. Not only is this suggestive with regard to the possibilities of human love but 
it also requires that divine love not be exclusive to evaluation. How could this be? 
What, then, is agape? Is it possible that both thematic agape and altruism are 
misunderstood, misapplied, or both to some degree?62 The answers to these and 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
given. As Stephen Post observes, “Self-less, purely one-way love may be an 
understandable exaggeration of unselfishness, but its impact is essentially negative in that it 
undermines the circular flow of giving and receiving in which agape is sustained and 
supported.” Post, Theory of Agape, 12. Further, Gene Outka warns that utter “self-sacrifice 
in itself would appear to provide no way of distinguishing between attention to another’s 
needs and submission to his exploitation and no warrant for resisting the latter.” Outka, 
Agape, 275. 
59See the discussion of other-inclusive love and unselfish self-interest (e.g., as seen in 
Eph 5:28–30) in Peckham, The Love of God, 130–138. 
60Although there is a tendency to conflate conditionality and merit, I believe and have 
argued elsewhere that divine love is always unmerited and, yet, foreconditional. That is, 
God bestows love prior to any conditions but the continued enjoyment of love 
relationship with God is conditional upon appropriate response. See the discussion in 
Peckham, The Love of God, 201–203. 
61Jesus states, “for the Father Himself loves you, because you have loved Me and have 
believed that I came forth from the Father” (John 16:27). “For this reason the Father loves 
Me, because I lay down My life so that I may take it again” (John 10:17). 
62The cogency of this critique of the adequacy of the agapist of divine love for ethics 
has been recognized elsewhere. For example, Stephen G. Post presents a sustained 
criticism of what he calls “the idealizations of a one-way love.” Post, A Theory of Agape, 10. 
Cf. Stephen G. Post, “The Inadequacy of Selflessness: God’s Suffering and the Theory of 
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other questions that flow from a renewed consideration of the canonical 
conception of love hold significant implications for the development of a 
distinctively biblical and Christian ethics of love. 
Conclusion 
While conclusions regarding the nature of divine love and its place in Christian 
ethics continue to proliferate, it seems to me that views founded upon the agapist 
conception of divine love do not suffice for Christian ethics. In my view, an 
ethical system based on utterly disinterested-love, wherein “love” gives but never 
receives, would (among other things): depersonalize ethics from its biblical 
context of relationship, remove the Christian motivation of bringing 
pleasure/delight to God, require total self-abnegation which seems opposed to the 
biblical ideal for unselfish but not self-loathing love, and lack the covenantal 
context of love. Moreover, it seems that the agapist conception of divine love, 
wherein “agape” love is only attributable to God, stands at odds with Christ’s 
command to “love [agapa?] one another, even as I have loved [agapa?] you” (John 
13:34) and thus tends to distort and reduce the nature and force of Christ’s 
example of love that is to be reflected by Christians. 
Perhaps the way forward for an ethics of love requires a deliberate return to 
examine the meaning of divine love as posited in the biblical canon in order to 
clarify the potential meaning and function of divine love and, only then, its 
implications for Christian ethics. Such an investigation would take seriously the 
questions that continue to rise to the fore, including but not limited to: What if 
divine love is much more relational than the agapist conception of love allows? 
What if love actually involves some degree of reciprocality and give and take, as is 
being increasingly suggested by numerous theologians? What if the love of God is, 
in fact, the personal and relational love that the incarnate God modeled while he 
was on earth and called humans to reflect? The implications for Christian ethics 
could be enormous; focused attention on the canonical conception of divine love 
might illuminate a way forward toward a more distinctively Christian and biblical 
ethics of love. 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Love,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 56, no. 2 (1988): 213–228; Stephen G. 
Post, Altruism & Altruistic Love: Science, Philosophy, & Religion in Dialogue (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002). Cf. Gene Outka, Agape, 275.?
